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PLANTINGA’S RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY,
SKEPTICAL THEISM, AND DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS
Andrew Moon

Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology has been used to respond to many
debunking arguments against theistic belief. However, critics have claimed
that Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with skeptical theism, a view
often used in response to the problem of evil. If they are correct, then a common way of responding to debunking arguments conflicts with a common
way of responding to the problem of evil. In this paper, I examine the critics’
claims and argue that they are right. I then present two revised versions of
Plantinga’s argument for his religious epistemology. I call the first a religionbased argument and the second an intention-based argument. Both are compatible
with skeptical theism, and both can be used to respond to debunking arguments. They apply only to theistic beliefs of actual persons who have what
I call doxastically valuable relationships with God—valuable relationships the
goods of which entail the belief that God exists.

I. Introduction
Alvin Plantinga, reflecting on his days as a young philosopher at Wayne
State University, writes,
[George] Nakhnikian was our chairman; he thought well of my powers as
a budding young philosopher, but also thought that no intelligent person
could possibly be a Christian. He would announce this sentiment in his usual stentorian tones, whereupon Robert Sleigh would say, “But what about
Al, George? Don’t you think he’s an intelligent person?” George would have
to admit, reluctantly, that he thought I probably was, but he still thought
there had to be a screw loose in there somewhere.1

Developmental psychologist Paul Bloom writes,
Recently psychologists doing research on the minds of infants have discovered two related facts . . . One: human beings come into the world with a
predisposition to believe in supernatural phenomena. And two: this predisposition is an incidental by-product of cognitive functioning gone awry.2

These quotes challenge the claim that theistic beliefs are formed by reliable, properly functioning faculties. They are examples of what Plantinga
Plantinga, “A Christian Life,” 64.
Bloom, “Is God an Accident?”
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calls de jure objections to theistic belief, which claim that theistic belief lacks
a valuable epistemic property. De jure objections are distinct from de facto
objections, which claim that theistic belief is false. Arguments that often
support de jure objections are now popularly called debunking arguments,
which criticize a belief on the basis of how it was formed.
Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology in Warranted Christian Belief has
been used to respond to many de jure objections (or debunking arguments)
against theistic belief.3 However, critics have claimed that Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with skeptical theism, a view often used in
response to the problem of evil.4 If they are correct, then a common way of
responding to debunking arguments against theistic belief conflicts with a
common way of responding to the problem of evil. In this paper, I examine
in detail both whether there is any such conflict and also whether there are
feasible ways to resolve that conflict. I argue that the prospects are bleak. I
then present two revised versions of Plantinga’s argument for his religious
epistemology. I call the first a religion-based argument and the second an
intention-based argument. Both are compatible with skeptical theism, and
both can be used to respond to debunking arguments. They apply only to
theistic beliefs of persons who have what I call doxastically valuable relationships with God—valuable relationships with goods that entail the belief
that God exists.
Although skeptical theists have obvious reasons to be interested in this
paper, here is one reason worth making explicit. It is common to think that
skeptical theism conflicts with many arguments for God’s existence.5 As
a result, the skeptical theist might be tempted to embrace reformed epistemology, which says that theistic belief can be warranted or rational even if it
is not based on argument.6 But the most influential version of reformed epistemology is Plantinga’s. Hence, such a skeptical theist should be interested
in whether her view conflicts with the most influential version of reformed
epistemology.7

3
For some illustrations of the influence of Plantinga’s religious epistemology on the religious debunking literature, see White, “You Just Believe That Because . . . ,” 583; Clark and
Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 21–22; Dawes and Jong, “Defeating the Christian’s Claim”; Murray and Schloss, “Evolutionary Accounts of Religion,” 251–252; Moon,
“Recent Work,” 881–882; Braddock, “Debunking Arguments,” 280–282; Wielenberg, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” 89–90; McNabb and Baldwin, “Divine Methodology”; and
Law, “The X-Claim Argument.”
4
See Fales, “Critical Discussion” and McBrayer and Swenson, “Skepticism About the Argument from Divine Hiddenness,” which will be discussed later in the paper.
5
For example, see Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism,” 389; Lovering, “On What God Would
Do”; O’Connor, “Theistic Objections”; Wilks, “The Structure”; and Wilks, “The Global Skepticism Objection.”
6
Lovering (“On What God Would Do,” 97) says that his argument for the inconsistency
of skeptical theism and arguments from natural theology does not pertain to reformed epistemology.
7
It might not conflict with all versions of reformed epistemology. See Tucker, “Phenomenal Conservatism.”
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II. Skeptical Theism
Following Michael Bergmann, let skeptical theism consist in the conjunction
of theism with three claims:
ST1: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we
know of are representative of the possible goods there are.
ST2: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we
know of are representative of the possible evils there are.
ST3: We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations
we know of between possible goods and the permission of possible
evils are representative of the entailment relations there are between
possible goods and the permission of possible evils.8
Suppose that ST1 is true. It could be that the goods we know of just are all
the possible goods, or they are just a tiny sample. We don’t know. But if we
do not know that the possible goods we know of are representative of the
possible goods there are, then we do not know that the possible reasons
God has for acting that we know about are representative of the total set
of reasons God might have for acting. ST2 and ST3 similarly describe more
ways in which we might be ignorant about God’s reasons.
To be clear, ST1–ST3 do not imply that we do not know any of God’s
reasons. For example, the skeptical theist can endorse ST1 and still affirm
that some things are good, and hence, as goods, they can figure into God’s
reasons. (Plausibly, something’s being good is a reason, albeit a defeasible one, for God to instantiate it.) What she cannot know is whether the
known possible goods are representative of the total set of possible goods.
Thus, it is possible that God has reasons unknown by us.
Here is a way to apply ST1–ST3 to a version of the problem of evil.
Suppose someone argues that since we cannot think of a reason for why
God would allow a particularly horrendous event, there likely is no such
reason; therefore, God probably does not exist. Skeptical theism implies
that the first inference is illicit since we might not be privy to the total set
of reasons God has for acting.9 Again, skeptical theism is not saying that
we cannot know that the horrendous event was evil or that, since it was
evil, God didn’t have a reason to stop it. Skeptical theism simply implies
that since we do not know if the goods and evils we know of are representative of the possible goods and evils there are, we may not infer that God
had an all-things-considered reason to stop it.

8
See Bergmann (“Skeptical Theism,” 376–381) for a detailed explanation of these theses
and how they represent the skepticism expressed by many skeptical theists. In that reference,
as well as in Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 11–12, Bergmann also adds an
ST4 to the definition of “skeptical theism.” I do not include it for the sake of brevity, and
nothing in this paper depends on its addition.
9
See Bergmann, “Skeptical Theism,” 389 and Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical
Theism” for the application of ST1–ST3 to other formulations of the problem of evil.
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It is worth noting that there are other definitions of “skeptical theism”
besides Bergmann’s. I picked his definition because he is a prominent
skeptical theist, and his version is at least as clearly defined and well
defended as any other in the literature. Furthermore, I suspect that any
claims I make about Bergmann’s skeptical theism could be made about
other versions of skeptical theism. Lastly, I only need ST1 to make the
claims I wish to make about skeptical theism and its relation to Plantinga’s
religious epistemology; skeptical theists who do not accept all of ST1–ST3,
but accept at least ST1, should agree with my conclusions.10
III. Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology
III.A. Background
In this subsection, I explain Plantinga’s theory of warrant and his view
about how people often form theistic beliefs. Plantinga technically defines
“warrant” as whatever it is that makes the difference between knowledge
and mere true belief. He then defends his proper functionalist theory of
warrant, which says,
[A] belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S
by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a
cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties,
according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth.11

For example, my belief that there is a plant in front of me is warranted if and
only if the belief was formed by properly functioning visual faculties, in
an environment appropriate for my visual faculties (good lighting conditions), and the design plan of my visual faculties is successfully aimed
at truth.12 On the other hand, if I had Capgras Syndrome and thereby
believed that my mother is an imposter, then this belief would not be warranted because the mechanisms forming this belief were disordered.
I will assume that Plantinga’s proper functionalist theory is correct.
This is a controversial assumption since every theory of warrant is controversial.13 Even still, I will assume it is correct so that I can focus on
other interesting issues, and it is best to focus on one thing at a time. Furthermore, even if it is incorrect, it is still an interesting question whether
10
For discussion of many definitions of “skeptical theism,” see Rea, “Skeptical Theism,”
484–486. Although Rea does not specifically include ST1–ST3 into his definition of skeptical
theism, he does say that they are “an important part of a typical defense of skeptical theism”
(485). If he is correct, the skeptical theist should still be interested in this paper since it assesses whether Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with a typical defense of skeptical
theism, even if it doesn’t assess whether Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with
skeptical theism tout court.
11
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 156.
12
The quote only states necessary conditions, but for the purposes of this paper, we can
take them to be sufficient. The additional conditions are caveats to ward off Gettier cases,
which are irrelevant here.
13
For recent defenses of proper functionalism, see Boyce and Plantinga, “Proper Functionalism” and Boyce and Moon, “In Defense of Proper Functionalism.”
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theistic beliefs can meet these proper functionalist conditions. Note that
in the above quotes, neither Nakhnikian nor Bloom explicitly denied warrant to theistic belief. They only claimed either that it was the result of a
“loose screw” or “a cognitive mechanism gone awry,” i.e., not the result of
proper function or reliable belief formation.
Plantinga thinks that many theistic beliefs are not formed on the basis
of an argument. Rather, he takes the view that “there is a kind of faculty
or cognitive mechanism, what Calvin calls a sensus divinitatis, or sense of
divinity, which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs
about God.”14 The following example from Jean-Paul Sartre in his autobiography might be an example of the workings of the sensus divinitatis:
Only once did I have the feeling that [God] existed. I had been playing
with matches and burnt a small rug. I was in the process of covering up my
crime when suddenly God saw me. I felt his gaze inside my head and on
my hands. I whirled about in the bathroom, horribly visible, a live target.
Indignation saved me. I flew into a rage against so crude an indiscretion. I
blasphemed . . . He never looked at me again.15

Here is another example from C. S. Lewis:
You must picture me alone in that room in Magdalen, night after night, feeling, whenever my mind lifted even for a second from my work, the steady,
unrelenting approach of Him whom I so earnestly desired not to meet. That
which I greatly feared had at last come upon me. In the Trinity Term of 1929
I gave in, and admitted that God was God, and knelt and prayed: perhaps,
that night, the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England.16

Sartre formed the belief that God sees me, and Lewis formed the belief that
God is approaching. The beliefs do not seem to have been formed on the
basis of inference or argument. The question, now, is whether such beliefs
can be warranted.17
III.B. Plantinga’s Argument and De Jure Objections
A central part of Plantinga’s religious epistemology is his claim that if God
exists, then theistic beliefs are probably warranted. Here is Plantinga’s
argument for this claim:
[I]f theistic belief is true, then it seems likely that it does have warrant. If it is
true, then there is, indeed, such a person as God, a person who has created
us in his image (so that we resemble him, among other things, in having the
capacity for knowledge), who loves us, who desires that we know and love
him, and who is such that it is our end and good to know and love him. But
if these things are so, then he would of course intend that we be able to be
aware of his presence and to know something about him. And if that is so,
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 172.
Quoted in Bering, The Belief Instinct, 41.
16
Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 228–229.
17
For discussion of whether there is any such thing as a sensus divinitatis, see § 5 of Moon,
“Recent Work” and the references therein.
14
15
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the natural thing to think is that he created us in such a way that we would
come to hold such true beliefs as that there is such a person as God, that he
is our creator, that we owe him obedience and worship, that he is worthy
of worship, that he loves us, and so on. And if that is so, then the natural
thing to think is that the cognitive processes that do produce belief in God
are aimed by their designer at producing that belief. But then the belief in
question will be produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth: it will therefore have
warrant.18

Here is a reconstruction of his argument:
1) If God exists, then God created us in his image, loves us, desires
that we know and love him, and is such that it is our end to know
and love him.
2) If God created us in his image, loves us, desires that we know and
love him, and is such that it is our end to know and love him, then
God is probably such that he would intend that we be able to be
aware of his presence and know something about him.
3) If God is probably such that he would intend that we be able to be
aware of his presence and know something about him, then God
probably created us in such a way that we would come to hold certain true beliefs about God (e.g., that God exists, is our creator, and
loves us).
4) If God probably created us in such a way that we would come to
hold certain true beliefs about God (e.g., that God exists, is our
creator, and loves us), then belief in God is probably produced by
cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan
successfully aimed at truth (and is thereby probably warranted).
5) If God exists, then belief in God is probably warranted.19
Note that Plantinga is not arguing that theistic belief is warranted; he is
only arguing that it is probably warranted if true.
Before delving into the premises of this argument, it is worth noting
its dialectical power to respond to de jure objections. Earlier, I cited Bloom
as stating that psychologists have discovered that belief in God is the result of cognitive mechanisms “gone awry.” Nakhnikian seemed to think
that theistic belief was the result of a “loose screw in there somewhere.”
Armed with Plantinga’s religious epistemology, the theist can now say,
Well, your de jure objection might succeed if you assume God does not exist.
However, if God does exist, then theistic belief is probably not a result of
cognitive systems gone awry or a loose screw. Rather, it is likely to be formed

Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 189–190.
This reconstruction is based on the one in § 3 of Moon, “Recent Work,” although I do not
there mention the “God created us in his image” part.
18
19
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by properly functioning, reliable faculties. So, you need a good de facto objection against theistic belief to get your de jure objection off the ground.

Such a response can be given to the many de jure objectors who do not have
a good argument for atheism. In Plantinga’s words, “This fact by itself invalidates an enormous amount of recent and contemporary atheology; for
much of that atheology is devoted to de jure complaints that are allegedly
independent of the de facto question.”20 Plantinga’s response has played an
important role in the literature on religious debunking arguments.21
IV. Plantinga’s Argument and the Conflict with Skeptical Theism
IV.A. The Conflict
In the following, I examine the work of Fales and McBrayer and Swenson,
who claim that skeptical theism conflicts with Plantinga’s religious epistemology. When I say that they conflict, I am not saying that any one of
the premises in Plantinga’s argument is logically inconsistent with any of
ST1–ST3. I am saying that endorsing ST1–ST3 gives one a reason to doubt a
premise of Plantinga’s argument.22
Evan Fales asks, “Plantinga argues that an all-loving, omnipotent being
like God, who created us in his image, would want us to know that he exists. But is it so clear that we can know what God wants for us?”23 Fales’s
question might be aimed at premise 1, which states, “If God exists, then
God created us in his image, loves us, desires that we know and love him,
and is such that it is our end to know and love him.” To address Fales’s
question, I will first note an ambiguity in the word “desires.” The consequent of (1) could be saying merely that God has some desire for us to
know him or that God overall desires it.24 For example, I might desire more
chocolate cake but not overall desire this, given my stronger desire for
good health.25 The latter desire certainly does not imply that I do not have
some desire for the chocolate cake! I will thereby take “desire” in (1) to just
refer to some desire, not overall desire.
Here is an argument for an affirmative answer to Fales’s question. On
Plantinga’s understanding of “God,” God has “knowledge, power, and
love . . . to the maximal degree.”26 As such, God would love intrinsically
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 191.
See the references in n. 3.
22
The discussion in this section is a more in-depth version of a discussion in Moon,
“Recent Work,” 883.
23
Fales “Critical Discussion,” 360.
24
I mention this ambiguity in Moon, “Recent Work,” 883, although there I used “allthings-considered desires” and here, I use “overall desires.” I now prefer “overall desires”
because, strictly speaking, considerations are not necessarily present in all the relevant sort of
cases. Thanks to Mike Rea for a helpful comment.
25
Moon, “Recent Work,” 883.
26
For more on what he means by “God” and “theism,” see Plantinga, Warranted Christian
Belief, viii.
20
21
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valuable persons and desire their good. Furthermore, knowing and loving
God would be a great good, perhaps a person’s greatest good. (Justification: it is a great good to come to know and love exemplary persons, such
as God, who love you and desire your good.) It follows that God would
have at least some desire for this great good for us.27
But perhaps Fales is really wondering how we could know what God
overall wants. He writes,
Many theists—Plantinga among them—have expressed skepticism concerning the possibility of an adequate theodicy. What are the chances that we can
know what God wants, when he allows Bambi to roast in a forest fire? For
God’s purposes—indeed his morally significant purposes—may transcend
our understanding. . . . But indeed, if we are deficient in the way just suggested, then presumably we don’t have any knowledge of God’s purposes.28

Typically, if one wants X, then one will intend to bring about X; the exception is if one has other reasons to not bring about X. Fales is suggesting
that God might have such reasons. They will be morally significant reasons (or purposes) that transcend our understanding, so that what God
intends (and overall wants) to do is outside of our ken.
Justin McBrayer and Philip Swenson make a similar point:
What a sceptical theist is committed to, though, is a general scepticism about
our knowledge of what God would do in any particular situation. We don’t
think that atheists or theists can say with any serious degree of confidence
why God does what he does or why he would or wouldn’t do a certain
thing. But such a scepticism is healthy. . . . Alvin Plantinga assumes that
if God exists it is obvious that our belief-forming faculties are reliable. . . .
Given our scepticism, we are not sanguine about [this] inference (God might
well have other interests, motives, etc. than the few that we are able to decipher). And this seems entirely appropriate.29

We can see how their affirmation of skeptical theism in the first part of the
quote leads them to be skeptical about whether God might have unknown
reasons (i.e., “other interests, motives, etc.”). This in turn leads them to
be skeptical about what God would overall want or intend. It seems that
the criticisms of Fales and of McBrayer and Swenson should be aimed at
premise 2, which states, “If God created us in his image, loves us, desires
that we know and love him, and is such that it is our end to know and love
him, then God is probably such that he would intend that we be able to be
aware of his presence and know something about him.”
The connection between ST1–ST3 and premise 2 is this. ST1–ST3 imply
that we have no good reason to think that we are not in the dark about
some of God’s reasons. Hence, even if we could know that God desires for
27
Thanks to Emily Bingeman for helping me spell out this argument. For some reasons to
doubt this argument, see Murphy, God’s Own Ethics.
28
Fales, “Critical Discussion,” 360.
29
McBrayer and Swenson, “Skepticism About the Argument from Divine Hiddenness,”
145.
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us to know him, this desire could conflict with God’s desire to bring about
other unknown goods or prevent some unknown evils. Therefore, we are
in the dark about whether God would intend for us to know him. This
gives us reason to doubt (2). Call this the skeptical theist objection.
It is worth distinguishing this objection from a related one that some
have raised in discussions of this paper. Against (2), some have noted that
many people do not believe in God, are not aware of God’s presence, and
do not know and love him. This gives us reason to deny the consequent
of (2), that God would intend these things. This further gives us reason
either to deny the truth of the antecedent of (2) (via modus tollens), or to
deny the truth of the conditional. If we take the first option, then we also
have reason to deny the antecedent of (1), and hence, an argument that
God does not exist.30 The second option is to deny (2). So, either we have
an argument that God does not exist or an argument against (2).31 Neither
is a good option for a skeptical theist who wants to endorse Plantinga’s
argument. I will call this the absence of belief objection.32
IV.B. Addressing a Potential Misunderstanding
In this section, I will block a potential misunderstanding of the skeptical
theist objection. Robert Lovering distinguishes between two views:
(Broad Skeptical Theism) In every case, we cannot know what God
would do.
(Narrow Skeptical Theism) In some cases, we can know what God would
do and, in some cases, we cannot.33
One might think that the skeptical theist objection is the following: since
skeptical theism implies Broad Skeptical Theism, we cannot know that
God would intend anything in the way described in premise 2.
That is not the objection. First, skeptical theism does not imply Broad
Skeptical Theism. Here is an example from Bergmann to support this
claim.34 I know that I exist and that there is a past. Therefore, if God exists,
then he did not intend to permanently annihilate me before now. Hence,
30
Put this way, assuming the argument for premise 1 was sound, the first option resembles the sorts of arguments in Schellenberg, The Hiddenness Argument and Marsh, “Darwin
and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief.” For a non-skeptical theist response to Marsh, see
Braddock, “Theism, Naturalism, and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief.”
31
However, note that it is not obvious that nontheists will never know God. The original
premise (2) was ambiguous because it was not time-indexed. One could add the words
“right now” to the end of (2), and the objection sticks. That is how I have been interpreting
(2). But if we add the words “at some point of time” at the end, then the objection will not
stick. People’s not knowing about God right now does not entail that God has not intended
that they will eventually come to know about God.
32
Thanks to Robert Adams and Chris Tucker for conversation that helped to clarify this
objection and its application to the argument. The other premises also raise interesting issues,
which are beyond the scope of this paper. See Moon, “Recent Work” for more discussion.
33
Lovering, “On What God Would Do,” 90.
34
Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 15.
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I can know that God did not intend to permanently annihilate me before
now.35 ST1–ST3 does not conflict with this argument. In general, I can use
my commonsense knowledge to infer that God did not intend to make
certain propositions false.36
The skeptical theist objection is saying that, given ST1–ST3, we are not
in a position to know that God would intend for us to know him in the
way described in premise 2. Yes, perhaps we can know that God did not
intend to permanently annihilate us yesterday, and we can infer this from
our commonsense knowledge. But it seems that we cannot similarly infer
from our commonsense knowledge that God would intend for us to be
able to know him. So, even if Narrow Skeptical Theism is true, skeptical
theism still conflicts with Plantinga’s argument.37
V. What Can We Infer About What God Intends?
In the previous section, I showed how accepting skeptical theism gives
one a reason to doubt premise 2. Someone might think that all we have to
do is tweak the premise to strengthen Plantinga’s argument. In this section, I show why any such attempts are likely to fail.
V.A. Principles for Deriving God’s Intentions
How are we to know, of any event, that God intended that it occur? We
saw in the previous section that if we know that an event has occurred,
then we can know that God did not intend to prevent its occurrence. However, it is more difficult to know, even of events that we know have already
occurred, whether God intended for them to occur.
Perhaps one can reason in the following way. For any event that has
occurred or will occur, God knew that it would occur.38 Furthermore, for
any event that has occurred or will occur, God played some causal role in
its occurrence (by being the creator and sustainer of all things). We might
then affirm the following principle,
(Knowledge-Intention Principle) If God knew that his actions would result in E’s occurring, then God intended for E to occur,
and conclude that if an event has occurred, God intended for it to occur.
35
This example answers the charge in Lovering, “On What God Would Do” (104) that
Narrow Skeptical Theism is ad hoc.
36
See Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 14–16 for other things we could
know that God would do, even if skeptical theism is true. See also his technical definition of
‘commonsense knowledge.’
37
Rea (“Skeptical Theism,” 485), a skeptical theist, suggests that he can have knowledge
of God’s reasons for action via scripture. This could, in principle, help Plantinga’s argument,
but adding propositions from scripture would make the argument more like the one to be
given in § VI, which is what I call a religion-based argument. I will postpone that discussion
until then. Also, whether divine revelation conflicts with skeptical theism is itself very controversial, cf. Wielenberg, “Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies” and Segal, “Skeptical Theism
and Divine Truths.”
38
This assumes that open theism is false. I will assume this for the sake of my interlocutor.
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But the Knowledge-Intention Principle is false. Suppose God intends
to make a bush look like it is on fire. God might also know that this event
will cause a nearby plant to cast a shadow. But the casting of the shadow
might not have been God’s intention, despite God’s knowing that his actions would result in its occurrence. God could have been completely
indifferent to the shadow.
The problem, one might think, is that God did not have any desire for
the casting of the shadow. Perhaps the principle just needs to be slightly
revised,
(Desire-Intention Principle) If God has some desire for E to occur and
God knew that his actions would result in E’s occurring, then God intended for E to occur.
Returning to the burning bush example, God might have known that
burning a bush would cause a nearby plant to cast a shadow, but since
God did not desire it, God did not intend it. However, if we grant that God
did want there to be a shadow, and that God knew that burning the bush
would cast the shadow, then it is very plausible that God also intended it.39
Unfortunately, the principle still has a counterexample.40 Consider, first,
a counterexample to a generalized version of the Desire-Intention Principle,
one that applies to any agent and not just God. Suppose that before Isaac’s
death, Esau promises him that he will not take revenge on Jacob for his
wrongful deeds. Esau still wants Jacob to suffer for his wrongdoings,
which is what Jacob deserves, but Esau promises to not act on this desire.
Later that day, Esau sees a trolley headed toward five children. Esau also
happens to see that if he pulls a switch to divert the trolley from killing
the five children, then the trolley will hit Jacob instead, which will hurt
him. Esau decides to pull the switch with the intention of saving the five
children. Esau knows that his actions will result in Jacob’s suffering. Esau
also happens to desire for Jacob to suffer, but in keeping with his promise,
the desire is not his reason for acting; he is acting solely with the intent
of saving the children. In this case, Esau did not in fact intend for Jacob
to suffer. After all, he had promised not to take revenge on Jacob, and
he wanted above all to honor his promise to Isaac. The counterexample
utilizes the well-known fact that we sometimes have a reason to cause X
(i.e., a desire for X) that is not the reason why we cause X, which makes it
possible for us to have not intended to cause X.
I will now provide a counterexample to the Desire-Intention Principle
that is also relevant to Plantinga’s argument. Imagine a possible scenario
in which God desires for some person, Fred, to be in a relationship with
him, and that God knows that his actions will result in Fred’s being in this
relationship with him. We can add the following to the case:
Thanks to Kenny Boyce and Josh Smart for help here.
I thank Philip Swenson for the core idea behind this counterexample. Thanks also to
Brian Cutter for helpful, clarifying discussions.
39
40
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a) God has a reason not to use his desire for a relationship with Fred
as his reason for action.
This reason would be analogous to the promise-making in the earlier example. The reason need not be God’s having made a promise. It could just
be some other good that would be attained by God’s not using his desire
for relationship as his reason for action. It seems metaphysically possible
that there could be such a good.
We could then add,
b) There is some good that God intends to instantiate, such that the
relationship with Fred is only a known byproduct of that intention.
The good mentioned in (b) would be analogous to the saving of five lives
in the earlier example. Again, this good need not be the saving of five
lives. It just needs to be some good, the achieving of which will happen
to meet God’s desire to have a relationship with Fred. All of this seems
metaphysically possible. Furthermore, it seems that God will not have
intended Fred’s being in relationship with him. So, the Desire-Intention
Principle also has a counterexample.
V.B. The Counterexample and Skeptical Theism
I could imagine the following reply. “Yes, that is a nice metaphysically
possible counterexample to the Desire-Intention principle. But let us suppose that Fred is a real person in the actual world who has a relationship
with God. Are you saying that the sort of state of affairs described by (a)
and (b) obtains in the real world? That seems unlikely!” I will argue that
we cannot know that it is unlikely, if skeptical theism is true.41
Suppose that ST1 is true. Then we do not have a good reason to think
that the goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there
are. We should then suspend judgment about whether, on a cosmic scale,
there are great goods to be gained if God simply refrains from using his
desire for relationship with Fred as a reason for action. Hence, we should
suspend judgment about whether, in the actual world, (a) is true. Furthermore, given ST1, we have reason to suspend judgment about whether, on
a cosmic scale, there is a great unknown good to be gained, so that God’s
relationship with Fred is a mere known byproduct of God’s intention to
actualize that great unknown good. So, we should suspend judgment
about (b).
Hence, if skeptical theism is true, then we should suspend judgment
about whether the goods under discussion actually exist. To help drive
in this point, recall how the skeptical theist uses ST1 to respond to the
problem of evil. Just as ST1 is supposed to justify withholding judgment
about whether there is a good that justifies horrendous evils (despite our
41
See Pruss, “Omnirationality,” 5, where he says that it is probably rare for God to be in
this situation. However, he gives no reason for thinking that this would be the case, given
skeptical theism.
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being unable to think of any such good), so it should justify withholding
judgment about whether the goods described by (a) and (b) exist. It might
initially seem probable that there are no such goods, just as it initially seems
probable that there is no good that could justify God’s allowing the evils
of the Holocaust. But if the skeptical theist is right, then we are not in the
position to make such probability judgments.
In § IV, the previous section, I argued that skeptical theism undermines
premise 2 of Plantinga’s argument; given skeptical theism, inferences
about God’s intentions from God’s desires are unjustified. In this section, I
have gone further by showing how attempts to tweak premise 2 are likely
to fail. Even if we also stipulated that we knew quite a bit about God’s desires, causal activity, and knowledge, it would still be difficult to properly
infer anything about God’s intentions, given skeptical theism.42 So, I conclude that the conflict between skeptical theism and Plantinga’s argument
is a deep one that is extremely difficult to overcome.
VI. New Versions of Plantinga’s Argument
VI.A. Religion-Based Arguments
Call Plantinga’s argument a bare-theism-based argument. It moves from the
bare existence of God, to claims about God’s intentions, and finally to the
claim that theistic belief is warranted. I showed that such an argument is
very likely to conflict with skeptical theism. I will now argue that what I
call religion-based arguments can both be consistent with skeptical theism
and also have the resources to block de jure objections. These arguments
do not make inferences about God’s intentions just from God’s bare existence, but from substantive claims about God’s intentions already made or
implied in an established religion.
The religion-based argument I discuss in-depth will be based on Christianity.43 The first premise is
(1*) If Christian belief is true, then God intended for the cognitive faculties of theists who have a “doxastically valuable relationship” to
form true, theistic beliefs.
I will explain what I mean by “doxastically valuable relationship” and
“true, theistic beliefs.” S has a doxastically valuable relationship with T only if
S and T have a valuable relationship that exemplifies goods that entail that
S believes that T exists.44 Plausibly, one can have a relationship with God
without believing that God exists. For example, someone might suspend
judgment about God’s existence but still throw out a hopeful prayer now
However, see n. 37.
Thanks to Kenny Boyce and Mike Rota for convincing me that this is a feasible way
to go.
44
Notice that I avoid referring to those theists who know God, as Plantinga does, because
this might imply knowledge that God exists, which would take away the point of the argument.
42

43
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and then. This might be sufficient for some degree of meaningful relationship.45 However, consider the comfort one experiences from believing that
God is watching over me, or the joy one experiences from believing that God
loves me, or the thankfulness one experiences from believing that a beautiful
sunset is a gift from God.46 Intuitively, the comfort, joy, and thankfulness are
all good things, and this is at least partly because they all involve true beliefs
(given that Christianity is true). A doxastically valuable relationship with
God is one that exemplifies these types of goods, goods that entail the
presence of these theistic beliefs. Furthermore, these beliefs are examples
of the “true, theistic beliefs” mentioned in (1*).
A doxastically valuable relationship is, by definition, a valuable thing.
The comfort, joy, and thankfulness are also valuable, and it is plausible
that having the true beliefs about God that engender these goods is also
valuable. As we have seen, God would desire these valuable things, and
for anybody who has them, God would have known ahead of time that
his causal activity would bring them about. But would it follow that God
intended those goods? As we saw in section V, the Desire-Intention Principle is false; God’s knowingly causing a desired outcome does not entail
his intending the outcome.
But suppose Christian belief is true. Now, as Plantinga writes, “the term
‘Christian belief,’ like most useful terms, is vague.”47 He then goes on to
note that even if a precise line cannot be drawn, such a line is not required
for his purposes. A precise line is not necessary for my purposes either. I
firstly need the plausible claim that on the Christian story, God loves humans, has special plans (or intentions) to redeem humans and bring about
relationship with them, and intends for himself to be glorified among
them. These claims are plausible on both liberal and conservative readings
of the Old and New Testaments. Given these divine plans for the humans,
it is plausible that doxastically valuable relationships with humans—and
the possession of correct theistic beliefs that partly constitute those relationships—are among God’s intentions. On the Christian story, God’s
desire for such relationships is not a reason that God, for some unknown
reason, decided not to use as his reason for action; the relationships are not
mere unintended byproducts of some other great unknown cosmic good.
This makes it plausible that human cognitive faculties forming those true,
theistic beliefs are part of God’s intentions.
Note that the consequent of (1*) refers only to a certain type of actual
theist: one with a doxastically valuable relationship with God. Unlike
Plantinga’s original argument, this one makes no claims about what God
45
Thanks to Allison Thornton for pressing me on this. See also the tapping case and fortuitous money case in Poston and Dougherty, “Divine Hiddenness,” 190–193 and the Turing chat
rooms and the hallucination scenario in Cullison, “Two Solutions,” 120–121 for more developed
examples of meaningful relationship without belief.
46
For a defense of the superiority of “doxastically valuable relationships,” see Schellenberg, “On Not Unnecessarily Darkening the Glass,” 201.
47
Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 202.

PLANTINGA’S RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY

463

would intend for humans generally. This restriction allows my argument
to avoid the absence of belief objection, since the argument is not about
those who have no theistic belief.48 The theist also does not need to be
Christian.49 For example, if Christianity is true, then God was obviously
intending to have doxastically valuable relationships with Moses and the
Israelites. Similarly, given the truth of Christianity, a non-Christian theist
who thanks God in the morning for the day and turns to God in prayer
during hard times will likely have a doxastically valuable relationship
with God. If Christian theism is true, then such relationships—and the
true, theistic beliefs that partly constitute them—are also likely part of
God’s intentions.50
Some might object by saying it does not follow from Christianity that
God intends the doxastically valuable relationships (and the relevant
beliefs) that (1*) ascribes.51 For example, perhaps on some versions of
Christianity, God only intends for doxastically valuable relationships with
a small group of elect Christians and not with anybody else. If they are
right, then (1*) is false.
However, as Plantinga notes, terms like “Christianity” and “Christian
belief” are vague. I concede that if one uses the terms differently than I do,
then (1*) will be false. On the other hand, if one uses “Christian belief” as I
do, then given my above argument, (1*) will likely be true. And that’s how
I mean “Christian belief” to be understood in the current religion-based
argument under discussion.52
The next premise states,
(2*) If God intended for the cognitive faculties of theists who have a
“doxastically valuable relationship” to form true, theistic beliefs,
then belief in God is probably produced in such persons by cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth in the environment for which those faculties were designed.
It makes the connection between God’s intentions for the cognitive faculties to produce the true, theistic beliefs and the proper functionalist
48
The question remains whether God intends for all people, including nontheists, to have
a doxastically valuable relationship with him. This raises issues about divine hiddenness,
which are beyond the scope of this paper. See the references in nn. 30, 45, and 46.
49
Thanks to comments from a referee of this journal, which led to this clarification and the
rest of this paragraph.
50
Note that this religion-based argument is not defending specific Christian beliefs, such
as beliefs in the Trinity, Incarnation, Resurrection, and more. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to examine how Plantinga’s Extended A/C Model, which centrally includes the claim
that if Christian belief is true, then Christian belief is warranted, applies to the argument
here.
51
Thanks to Domingos Faria for helpful conversation about this objection.
52
Furthermore, such a person might formulate her own religion-based argument with a
version of (1*) that restricts the doxastically valuable relationships to only the elect. The rest
of the argument could then be adjusted accordingly.
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conditions for warrant. Why believe (2*)? Suppose its antecedent is true
and that God did intend for cognitive faculties to produce the relevant,
true, theistic beliefs. Given that God is also the ultimate designer of human
cognitive faculties and their environments, it is plausible that when those
cognitive faculties produce these true, theistic beliefs according to God’s
intentions, those faculties are functioning properly according to a reliable,
truth-aimed design plan in the appropriate environments.
From (1*), (2*) and Plantinga’s theory of warrant, we conclude:
(3*) If Christian belief is true, then such theists’ belief in God is probably
warranted.
Can this new religion-based argument still play the same role of deflecting
de jure objections that the original bare-theism-based argument did? Let’s
see how the dialectic might work. Suppose a Christian skeptical theist
encounters a debunking argument against theistic belief. She could make
the following sort of reply, which is similar to the one the theist gave in
section III:
Well, your de jure objection might succeed if you assume Christian belief is false. However, if Christian belief is true, then theistic belief is
probably not a result of cognitive systems gone awry or a loose screw.
Rather, it is likely to be formed by properly functioning, reliable faculties. So, you need a good de facto objection against Christian belief to get
your de jure objection off the ground.
Such a response can be given to the many de jure objectors who do not
have a good de facto argument against Christian belief.
This response is dialectically weaker than the one based on the baretheism-based argument in the following way. Admittedly, it is easier to
provide a good de facto objection to Christian belief than to bare theistic
belief. The former is a much stronger claim, and so there are more ways it
could turn out to be false. However, so long as the objector has no good de
facto argument against Christian belief, such a skeptical theist is on good
ground and can make use of this response.
A religion-based argument need not be Christianity-based. To formulate an alternative, we just have to replace the antecedent of (1*) with a
religion that still implies (1*)’s consequent. In other words, it must be a
religion that we could plausibly substitute for X in the following premise:
(1**) If religion X is true, then God intended for the cognitive faculties
of theists who have a doxastically valuable relationship to form
true, theistic beliefs.
(2*) would remain the same, and then (3*) would be altered to say,
(3**) If religion X is true, then such theists’ belief in God is probably
warranted,

PLANTINGA’S RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY

465

so that its antecedent matches the antecedent of (1**). There might also
be Muslim or Jewish religion-based arguments of this form. However,
just as the success of the above Christian-based argument depends on the
relevant version of Christianity, so might Muslim or Jewish religion-based
arguments depend on the relevant versions of Islam or Judaism.53
VI.B. Intention-Based Arguments
Bare-theism-based arguments move from God’s mere existence to claims
about theistic beliefs. Religion-based arguments move from a religion to
claims about certain theistic beliefs. Intention-based arguments move from
claims about both God’s existence and intentions to claims about certain
theistic beliefs. These arguments can be used by theists who do not hold
to a major monotheistic religion but simply believe that God intended for
theists to have the true, theistic beliefs that partly constitute a doxastically
valuable relationship with God.54
To formulate such an argument, one can just skip (1*), or any instantiation of (1**), and simply start the argument with (2*):
(2*) If God intended for the cognitive faculties of theists who have a
“doxastically valuable relationship” to form the true, theistic beliefs, then belief in God is probably produced in such persons by
cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan
successfully aimed at truth in the environment for which those faculties were designed.
And from Plantinga’s theory of warrant, it follows that
(3***) If God intended for the cognitive faculties of theists who have a
“doxastically valuable relationship” to form the true theistic beliefs, then such theists’ belief in God is probably warranted.
As with the religion-based argument, since it starts with assumptions
about God’s intentions, there is no good reason to think it conflicts with
skeptical theism.
Here is how one would use the intention-based argument in a reply to
a de jure objection:
Well, your de jure objection might succeed if you assume that God
doesn’t intend for theists who have a “doxastically valuable relationship” to form true, theistic beliefs—that, either God doesn’t exist, or
that even though he exists, he lacks that intention. However, if God
exists and does have such an intention, then theistic belief is probably
not a result of cognitive systems gone awry or a loose screw. Rather, it
53
Examining whether this style of argument is open to other religions is beyond the scope
of this paper. Considerations by Baldwin and McNabb, “An Epistemic Defeater for Islamic
Belief” might cast doubt on whether there could be a Muslim-based argument of this form.
54
Thanks to Tyler McNabb and Brian Cutter for helpful discussion that led to my formulating an intention-based argument.
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is likely to be formed by properly functioning, reliable faculties. So, you
need a good de facto objection against my theistic belief to get your de
jure objection off the ground.
Such a response can be given to the many de jure objectors who do not
have a good argument for atheism or a good argument that God did not
intend as such. And many do not have any such argument.
This reply is also dialectically weaker than the reply based on the baretheism-based argument. It is easier to provide a good de facto objection to
theism + X than to theism. The former is a stronger claim, and so there are
more ways it could turn out to be false. So, like the religion-based argument, this new response is dialectically weaker. Fortunately, so long as the
objector has no good de facto argument against theism+X, such a skeptical
theist can still make good use of this response.
Here is an objection.55 Suppose the de jure objector has no particular
good de facto objection to theism. Even so, since I am now adding a very
particular claim about God’s intentions, doesn’t that make the de facto
claim unlikely? If so, then perhaps that itself is a good de facto objection to
my theism + X.
In response, I do not think it is unlikely.56 Compare the claim that God
intended the faculties of those with doxastically valuable relationships
to produce their true, theistic beliefs with the claim that God intended
the ears of philosophers to be homing devices for bees. The latter claim
does seem unlikely (even if God exists). We already know about the functions of ears, and we know that they have none of the mechanisms that
would even come close to qualifying as homing devices for bees. On the
other hand, it is unclear—or at least there is significant disagreement
about—which cognitive mechanisms give rise to theistic beliefs and what
the functions of those various mechanisms are.57 Now, suppose that God
exists. Then it does not seem unlikely that God is the ultimate designer of
human beings’ cognitive faculties. Given that many humans around the
world have doxastically valuable relationships with God, it also does not
seem unlikely that God’s intention was for their cognitive faculties to form
the true, theistic beliefs that partly constitute the doxastically valuable relationships. We have nothing parallel to the bee case here. So, I think that
the above de facto objection fails.
I conclude that believers from different religions, as well as many theists
who do not have a background religion, have at least two Plantingainspired options by which to respond to de jure objections in the spirit

Thanks to Mark Murphy for this objection.
Thanks to Brian Cutter for helpful conversation.
57
For literature on this topic, see Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe; Bering, The Belief
Instinct; Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology”; Thurow, “Does Cognitive Science Show Belief in God to be Irrational?”; Braddock, “Debunking Arguments”; Braddock,
“An Evidential Argument for Theism”; and the references in n. 31 of Moon, “Recent Work.”
55
56
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captured by the mantra: “Your de jure objection requires a de facto objection
. . . a de facto objection that you don’t have.”
VII. Conclusion
I have argued that skeptical theism conflicts with one of the premises of
Plantinga’s argument for the claim that if God exists, then belief in God
is probably warranted. It follows that a prominent way of responding
to the problem of evil is in conflict with a prominent way of responding
to popular de jure objections to theistic belief. This might seem to either
leave skeptical theists without one of the most influential responses to de
jure objections, or leave proponents of Plantinga’s religious epistemology
without a prominent response to the problem of evil. This needn’t be such
a bad thing; not all theists like skeptical theism, and there are other ways
to respond to de jure objections.58 However, it still gives theists fewer options by which to defend their beliefs.
Fortunately, instead of appealing to Plantinga’s bare-theism-based argument, I have shown that one can appeal to religion-based arguments or an
intention-based argument, both of which are in the spirit of his religious
epistemology. They do not conflict with skeptical theism, and they have a
similar ability to deflect de jure objections. I conclude that even though skeptical theists cannot hold to Plantinga’s exact religious epistemology, they
can still consistently hold to religious epistemologies that are in its spirit.59
Virginia Commonwealth University

58
Perhaps this is why in the later part of his career (e.g., Plantinga, “Supralapsarianism”),
Plantinga started depending more on his O Felix Culpa theodicy. Also, see Thurow, “Does
Cognitive Science Show Belief in God to be Irrational?”;” and Braddock, “Theism, Naturalism, and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief” for alternative responses to theistic debunking
arguments.
59
I received help from many people on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks to two
anonymous referees of this journal and especially to the editor, Mark Murphy, for helpful
comments. Thanks to Louise Williams for helpful editing. Thanks to Michael Bergmann,
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